Tip of the Spear

A few more notes to help me communicate with you better and then we are back to our story. The vehicles in my platoon had bumper numbers which allowed them to be easily identified. So if I reference a bumper number (i.e. CML 60) I am just referring to a particular vehicle. In the platoon, CML 60-66 were smoke generator tracks (I traveled in CML 60); CML 67 was our cargo truck; CML 69 was our fog oil fueler; and CML 72 was our M88 maintenance vehicle. So on with the tale...


6/68th (my platoon) was task organized under 2-69 Armor "Panther" Battalion once in the open Kuwaiti desert. Commanded by LTC Sanderson, "Speed and Power" had no plan to use smoke during its attack to OBJ CLAY, a bridge crossing the Euphrates just to the north west of Tahlil Air Base. The general consensus by the planning staff and Panther 6 (Sanderson) was that the wind direction was not favorable to the use of smoke, nor were they comfortable using smoke in any manor because 2-69 was not well trained in the use of smoke. When concerns were brought to 3rd Brigade Chemical Section about the lack of mission for smoke, they insisted that smoke would be used and that the only way 6/68th would be at the correct place at the decisive moment in combat was to roll with Task Force 2-69. So while Brigade spoke of smoke, 2-69 spoke of Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) duty.

Despite higher headquarters pessimism the platoon began a rigorous training program. Including intensive weapons cleaning, PMI, and a trip to the mounted .50 CAL range. The platoon managed to sneak out of the burm for two days (non-consecutive) of smoke maneuver training which included DVE driver training (the DVE is the visual optics on the M58 smoke generator used to see through smoke), racetrack techniques, mobile and stationary smoke, and movement formations. The rest of the training was centered on EPW skills: Arabic classes, Iraqi culture classes, and first aid.

The major issues within the platoon at this point, and ones that would not be solved throughout the campaign, was the platoon's mail, and that they had two non mission capable .50 Caliber Machine Guns still at Camp Arifjan. As it turns out, CML 60 and CML 62 would both cross the border without their main means of security.
Training stopped on the 15th of March. That night every command and control vehicle, including CML 60, in V Corps went through a mounted Command Post Exercise (CPX) of the border crossing. The CPX appeared to be much of an exercise for higher headquarters and the task force was a training tool. They did have an elaborate mock up of the border crossing, which served well giving the troops a read on what to expect when they crossed the border.

Prior to the CPX and following, the platoon conducted elaborate rehearsals of the phase of the upcoming invasion up until OBJ CLAY. Smoke platoon's mission was a "be prepared to" mission to provide a haze of smoke vicinity OBJ CLAY. Additionally Smoke platoon would be responsible for EPW control. The smoke mission would change from BPT to "On Order", if the Iraqis destroyed the bridge.

On March 19, 2003, TF 2-69 moved from AA Hammer to a position along the Kuwaiti/Iraqi Border. They moved under cover of darkness beginning about 2000 hours. CML 62 had already begun to have electrical problems that would continue to hinder it throughout the operation. For about an hour, it could not drive faster then 10 MPH, but seemed to come back to life and continued. With 6/68th poised twenty kilometers from the borderair warairwar began at 0430 local time. The soldiers remained especially calm; many were excited not afraid. Many tuned into the BBC to try and hear GW Bush's opening war speech, this would be the last time that they could pick up the BBC until they got to Baghdad.

As the sun went down on the 20th the task force again moved north along the border. The LD time across the border kept changing. The changes were based on whether or not the Iraqis set their oil wells on fire. If they did, the marines would need to cross the border to stop them, and in order to synchronize the invasion 3rd Infantry Division would need to invade as well. Friendly JDAB missiles began to fly about 2000 hours. A few of the company commanders kept coming over the task force radio net and saying motivational things. "That's a JDAB missile and it's on its way to BAGHDAD!!" "Let Freedom Reign!!"

The order finally came and 6/68 "Smoke Dog" Platoon crossed PL Florida, the international border, at 233020MAR03 making 6/68th the first chemical unit to cross the border as 2-69 was the first task force across as well. The Task Force continued north with little resistance. Much of the local population had fled or was hidden within towns. They continued to roll north stopping only to refuel, once at 0500, then at 1100. JSTARS picked up a few Moving Target Indicators (MTIs) but it really turned out to be nothing at least after a few HEAT rounds. Three different Abrams drove over Iraqi mines, but no battle damage was taken. At 1300 the TF was poised in Assault Position BARROWS and was waiting for 1-41 Field Artillery to catch up for support during the attack around OBJ FIREBIRD, Tahlil Air Base, and onward to OBJ CLAY.


Artillery moves up in TF formation to send counterfire

At 1830 the attack continued toward OBJ CLAY. While along highway one the Task Force came under enemy artillery fire. Panther 6 called franticly over the net for some "freakin counterfire". He got his wish as 1-41 FA rolled two batteries of Paladins up along side Smoke Platoon on the highway and let the steel rain fly. 1-41 FA continued to walk the battalion forward all the way to OBJ FIRBIRD. Enroute to OBJ FIREBIRD A/2-69 captured three EPWs.

2-69 was unsure what to do with the EPWs when Panther 5 came over the Command Net and added, "That's what we have Smoke Dog for." CML 66 and CML 65 then moved to process the three EPWs. One was a Captain with a large amount of Iraqi money. The Smoke soldiers immediately took control of the scene, zip tying all of the captives and inventorying all of their personal items. Meanwhile TF 2-69 captured and additional 30 "EPWs". CML 60 and CML 61 went ahead to gain control of these EPWs, but when they arrived on the scene TF 2-69 had released these EPWs and they were no where to be found.

It was then discovered that the bridge across the Euphrates River (OBJ CLAY) was not rigged with any type of explosive. TF 2-69 continued the attack north and seized OBJ CLAY by 020022MAR03, sending B/2-70 Armor from 1st Armor Division across the bridge.

Following the seizure of OBJ CLAY TF 2-69 moved southwest 15 kilometers along highway 8 to AA PANTHER. The intended assembly area turned out to be swampland and unusable by an armored Task Force. They then worked with the Special Forces and turned into a small village along the highway to use as an assembly area. The ploy worked but there were many civilians that came out, begging for food and just being curious.


Here behind SPC Bristow you can see the Iraq Village near Tahlil Air Base. On the left is an approaching Iraqi boy. This is the area in which we took a tactical pause for maintenance.

Here the Task Force took a tactical pause and scrambled to accomplish some key maintenance tasks. It was apparent that CML 63 was about to loose its right idler wheel, and CML 60 was about to loose its left center road wheel. As no parts were on hand, CML 60's road wheel, road arm, and torsion bar were removed. CML 63, it was decided, would ride on the idler wheel until it completely fell off, and then short track that side until the next tactical pause. During this time CML 72 was located 200 meters away, until TF 2-69 called it to recover an Iraqi tank. TF 2-69 wanted this tank to take back to Ft Benning with them. This would be the last time Smoke Platoon would see CML 72 until late April. With whatever repairs could be made complete, CML 62 continued to have electrical problems and CML 66 had overheating problems, the Task Force waited for 1st BCT to pass along highway 8 and we would follow.


Despite our current situation, my track (CML 60)takes a second out to laugh.

Left is SPC Lee the smoke generator operator, underneath is the driver SPC Bristow and on the right is yours truly. Missing in the photo is the removed road wheel and torsion bar. For your reference the idler wheel is the left most wheel in this photo. CML 63's (not pictured) idler wheel was about to fall off and our plan was to short track it when it did. To short track means we planned to wrap the track around the roadwheels without an idler wheel. The idler wheel is important, however, because it is the adjustable wheel that will keep the track tight.